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FERC V. EPSA AND ADJACENT STATE REGULATION 
OF CUSTOMER ENERGY RESOURCES 
 




he Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”)1 was a major victory for 
demand response—efforts to coordinate customers not using energy—
in wholesale electric power markets. Justice Kagan’s decision for a six-Justice 
majority2 recognized that a watt is a watt, regardless of whether its source is a 
power producer or a customer (or group of customers) forgoing energy con-
sumption. EPSA’s majority viewed demand response as vital to promoting 
reliability and efficiency in energy markets. In upholding the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) rules to encourage participation of de-
mand response resources in wholesale demand power markets, the Court ended 
an ongoing battle surrounding compensation of demand response providers. 
Regulatory certainty about demand response resources will help to relieve 
congestion, reduce the need for new power plants, and promote renewable 
sources of energy.3  
This Essay explores EPSA’s implications on FERC’s jurisdiction over cus-
tomer-level clean energy resources such as state net metering policies for 
rooftop solar and energy storage programs. Since the Federal Power Act’s 
(“FPA”) adoption by Congress in 1935, most judicial decisions have ap-
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1 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
2 This 6-2 line up is somewhat unusual: Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, which was 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. 
As discussed below, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas. Justice 
Alito did not participate in review of the case or the decision.  
3  See, e.g., Darius Dixon, Supreme Court Backs Federal Authority in Power Saving Rule, 
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/BDA2-6A6Y?type=image (quoting Environmental 
Defense Fund President Fred Krup, “Today’s Supreme Court decision is a victory for all Americans 
who want greater choice and value broader customer access to clean, low-cost energy”); id. (quoting 
Allison Clements of Natural Resources Defense Council, who said the decision is key “because 
demand response is flexible and fast-acting, [so] it enables the affordable integration of more wind 
and solar power into the electricity transmission grid”). 
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proached federal-state jurisdictional disputes with reference to a jurisdictional 
“bright line.”4 Rather than fixate on this divide, the EPSA majority approached 
FERC’s jurisdiction in a functional manner, endorsing pragmatism over 
formalism in the regulation of energy markets. Unlike many past cases that 
fixated on a jurisdictional bright line, EPSA did not define a turf for state 
policymaking as beyond FERC’s reach but instead recognized how state 
policies operate adjacent to FERC’s regulation of practices affecting wholesale 
rates. As the first Supreme Court case to explicitly recognize cooperative 
federalism programs in the regulation of modern energy markets under the 
FPA, ESPA is also a victory for state policy flexibility. At the same time, its 
endorsement of expansive FERC authority to address discriminatory practices 
will only help to ensure that state clean energy policies complement—and do 
not work at odds with—competitive, efficient and reliable energy markets. 
 
I. EPSA’s Pragmatism in Defining FERC’s Jurisdiction 
 
EPSA resoundingly rejected a D.C. Circuit panel conclusion that FERC’s 
demand response regulation (Order 745) is ultra vires under the FPA because it 
regulates retail sales.5 In reversing the D.C. Circuit, EPSA held that FERC’s 
authority to adopt Order 745 is firmly supported by the clear language of 
sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. According to the majority, the language of 
the FPA should not be read “against its clear terms, to halt a practice [such as 
demand response] that so-evidently allows the Commission to fulfill its statu-
tory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in the wholesale 
energy market.”6  
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the EPSA majority reasoned that the FPA 
clearly authorizes FERC to regulate compensation for customer demand 
																																																								
4 As the Court stated more than 50 years ago: 
Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between federal and 
state jurisdiction, making unnecessary [] case-by-case analysis [of conflicts]. 
This was done in the Power Act by making FPC jurisdiction plenary and ex-
tending it to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which 
Congress has made explicitly subject to regulation by the states. 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
5 See EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit also held that FERC’s 
rule was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because FERC 
failed to provide a “direct response” to some of the objections made by commentators who main-
tained FERC’s rules would overcompensate demand response, resulting in discriminatory rates. Id. 
at 224–25. 
6 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 764. The Court upheld FERC’s demand regulations against an arbitrary and 
capricious standard, reversing the D.C. Circuit on this ground as well. Id. at 773.  
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response participation in interstate energy markets. Order 745 did not attempt 
to regulate demand response as a wholesale sale of energy. Rather, FERC based 
its adoption of Order 745 on the FPA’s delegation to the agency of authority to 
address “practices . . . affecting” its jurisdictional sales,7 because the agency 
concluded that failure to regulate demand response participation would encum-
ber competitive, efficient, and reliable wholesale power markets.  
Agreeing with FERC, the EPSA majority rejected the D.C. Circuit’s ar-
gument that Order 745 represented an agency power grab that lacks any 
limiting principle. The Court reasoned that FERC’s jurisdictional basis for 
Order 745 would not allow the agency to regulate any market activity, but (in 
accordance with established judicial precedents) only those practices that 
directly affected wholesale markets. Demand response “pays consumers for 
commitments to curtail their use of power, so as to curb wholesale rates and 
prevent grid breakdowns,”8 which according to the Court is within the agency’s 
clear statutory authorization “with room to spare.” 9  Excluding wholesale 
demand response from FERC’s jurisdiction, the Court added, would “prevent[] 
all use of a tool that no one . . . disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability 
in the wholesale electricity market.”10  
The EPSA majority also rejected the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the 
FPA reserves to state regulators exclusive authority over retail customer partici-
pation in wholesale demand response markets. Section 201(b) of the FPA 
expressly states that the provisions of the statute do not apply to “any other sale 
of electric energy” (other than wholesale sales). The D.C. Circuit had relied on 
this language to conclude that “[b]ecause FERC’s rule entails direct regulation 
of the retail market—a matter exclusively within state control—it exceeds the 
Commission’s authority.”11 EPSA’s majority noted that setting retail rates is 
beyond FERC’s jurisdiction under the plain terms of this provision of the FPA, 
but in Order 745 “the Commission has not regulated retail sales.”12 FERC’s 
regulation of demand response does not violate the FPA’s proscription on 
regulating “any other sale” “just because it affects—even substantially—the 
																																																								
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a). 
8 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770.  
9 Id. at 774.  
10 Id. at 773.  
11 EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In a dissent, Judge Harry Edwards treated 
the jurisdictional issue as ambiguous under the FPA, and indicated that he would have deferred to 
FERC’s interpretation of the statute. Id. at 227.  
12 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. 
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quantity or terms of retail sales.”13 Rather, the Court reasoned, “When FERC 
regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its 
charge to improve how the market runs, then no matter the effect on retail 
rates [the FPA] imposes no bar.”14  
In upholding FERC’s jurisdiction to adopt Order 745, EPSA made a 
strong appeal to statutory purpose.15 Congress adopted the FPA in 1935 to 
close the “Attleboro gap,” a regulatory void due to limits the Supreme Court 
had imposed on state regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.16 As 
the Supreme Court has consistently noted, in adopting the FPA “Congress 
interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of wholesale rates in inter-
state commerce for resale.”17 Additionally, if FERC were to lack jurisdiction 
over demand response, the majority warned, no regulator—federal or state—
would be able to address activities regarding demand response in wholesale 
power markets, since “state commissions could not regulate [wholesale] de-
mand response bids either.”18 Drawing a parallel to Attleboro, the majority 
added, “Congress passed the FPA precisely to eliminate vacuums of authority 
over the electricity markets.”19 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in EPSA, joined by Justice Thomas, called the ma-
jority’s jurisdictional analysis “extravagant.”20 It is perhaps fitting that Justice 
Scalia’s last published dissent before his untimely death took aim at the EPSA 
majority’s focus on statutory purpose, given his distaste for the use of legislative 
history in the interpretation of statutes. He raised particular concern with the 
majority’s reference to a 1961 decision that interpreted the Natural Gas Act so 
as to avoid the creation of a regulatory “no man’s land.”21 In that opinion, the 
Court noted that “in a borderline case where congressional authority is not 
explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given 
																																																								
13 Id. at 776. 
14 Id. at 764.  
15 As the Court noted, its determination is based on the clear language of the statute, not any sort 
of deference to the agency. Id. at 773 n.5 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).   
16 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).  
17 United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953). See also New York v. 
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal 
regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such as the gap identified in 
Attleboro . . . .”). 
18 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
21 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961).  
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area and, if we find it cannot, we are impelled to decide that federal authority 
governs.”22 By preventing the creation of “any” regulatory “no man’s land,” the 
EPSA majority explained, “The [Federal Power] Act makes federal and state 
powers ‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that “there [will] be no ‘gaps’ 
for private interests to subvert the public welfare.”23  
A practical consequence of EPSA’s focus on this statutory purpose of clos-
ing regulatory gaps is that the FPA’s allocation of federal-state authority over 
practices affecting rates cannot always result in a strict separation of authority, 
as a jurisdictional bright line would dictate. Rather, to the extent the FPA does 
not expressly foreclose it, the statute authorizes both federal and state regula-
tors to regulate the same activities in energy markets. FERC’s regulation of 
demand response occurs against the backdrop of a variety of different state 
policy approaches regarding customer demand response in retail markets, 
which encourages state experimentation. State policy flexibility regarding 
customer demand response has allowed new technologies and markets to 
develop to fit regional circumstances. FERC’s expansive authority over practic-
es affecting rates allows FERC to step in, if necessary, while also promoting 
complementary forms of state regulation—thus ensuring that no aspect of 
demand response participation in interstate energy markets goes unregulated.  
 
II. Pragmatic Experimentation in Regulation of Customer Energy  
Resources 
 
EPSA recognized how FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale energy market 
practices—such as demand response—is not fixed. As customer energy resource 
technologies and markets evolve, it is inevitable that FERC’s jurisdiction will 
expand into some arenas state regulators once considered exclusively their own 
turf. At the same time, EPSA showed the potential for FERC’s regulation of 
energy markets to pragmatically accommodate adjacent and complementary 
state policy experimentation.  
Despite the majority’s recognition of FERC’s authority to address demand 
response, EPSA also leaves state regulators considerable flexibility to pursue 
their own adjacent policy experiments with retail customer demand response. 
In upholding Order 745, the Supreme Court was careful not to invite top-
down regulation of clean energy initiatives. Indeed, EPSA was particularly 
																																																								
22 Id.  
23 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
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attentive to the significance of private and state policy initiatives in encouraging 
the development of customer demand response resources.  
State-led policy experimentation with customer energy resources is con-
sistent with the basic jurisdictional principles FERC endorsed in its regulation 
of demand response. To begin, EPSA rejected the D.C. Circuit’s specious 
argument that Order 745 overreaches because it “lure[s]” retail customers into 
the wholesale market.24 The Court reasoned that FERC’s regulation of demand 
response compensation is driven by the customer’s decision to participate in 
wholesale energy markets: If a retail customer forgoing energy consumption 
does not choose to bid into wholesale demand response markets, it simply is 
not subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA. 
Also of significance, EPSA upheld FERC’s demand rules as a “program of 
cooperative federalism.” Order 745 (which extends FERC’s earlier policy in 
Order 719) “allows any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from making 
demand response bids in the wholesale market,” thus giving states “the means 
to block whatever ‘effective’ increases in retail rates demand response programs 
might be thought to produce.”25 This “opt out” option allows FERC to set 
basic expectations for demand response resources in wholesale markets without 
discouraging state regulators from experimenting with a wide range of com-
plementary approaches to promote energy conservation.  
Allowing state experimentation in retail customer demand response poli-
cies to continue adjacent with FERC’s regulation of practices affecting 
wholesale rates can produce significant benefits. State flexibility in approaching 
demand response has promoted diverse policy experiments with customer 
demand response, especially given differences in state approaches to utility 
regulation. As a bottom-up approach, such policy flexibility has allowed de-
mand response resources to develop while also enabling markets and regulators 
to learn about the viability of various retail customer demand response initia-
tives.  
In a similar manner, EPSA sets the stage for state customer energy poli-
cies, such as net metering and customer storage programs, to flourish. To the 
extent that customer energy resource programs address distribution or genera-
tion facilities, the plain language of Section 201(b) of the FPA would appear to 
foreclose FERC from regulating them at all. Beyond this express prohibition 
on the regulation of certain facilities, EPSA clarifies that FERC may still 
regulate wholesale rates and practices that directly affect them. However, 
																																																								
24 Id. at 778. 
25 Id. at 780. 
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FERC has consistently disavowed exercising any jurisdiction over customer 
compensation for net metering on the grounds that metering does not consti-
tute a wholesale sale unless it results in a net sale over the customer’s billing 
period.26 EPSA makes it undeniably clear that state regulators should retain 
flexibility in approaching net metering policies. Other state policy initiatives for 
customer energy resources, such as incentives for retail customer energy storage, 
similarly would benefit from allowing states flexibility to experiment with their 
own policy approaches. 
After EPSA, however, it is also clear that the language of the FPA does 
not provide a fixed safe harbor that automatically exempts all state policy 
experimentation from FERC’s reach, as a bright line approach to jurisdiction 
would suggest. Rather, the FPA’s allocation of federal-state authority in this 
context is pragmatic and allows for adjacent state policies that complement 
FERC’s regulatory initiatives under the FPA. There still must be some outer 
limit on what states can do in regulating customer energy resources, especially 
when states aim their initiatives at protecting incumbents at the cost of com-
petitive, efficient, and reliable interstate markets.  
At the extreme, no state can outright prohibit a power supplier from sell-
ing into the wholesale market, as this would encroach into FERC’s jurisdiction 
over wholesale energy sales. As the Court made clear last term in ONEOK v. 
Learjet,27 state policies cannot target FERC jurisdictional programs, especially 
in ways that conflict with them.28 The Supreme Court’s pending review of the 
Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Maryland’s capacity incentives for new natural gas 
plants (on federal preemption grounds) will help to clarify the extent to which 
states retain authority over generation incentives that overlap with FERC-
approved market rules.29  
Similarly, if demand response is to operate as a cooperative federalism pro-
gram, FERC must ultimately possess some authority to address the most 
egregious barriers to customer participation in interstate energy markets. 
EPSA’s majority reasoned that FERC’s demand response rule’s “opt out” 
																																																								
26 Sun Edison LLC, 129 FERC ¶ 61,146 (2009), order on reh’g 131 FERC ¶ 61,213 (2010); 
MidAmerican, 94 FERC ¶ 61,340, at 62,262–64 (2001). For discussion, see Jim Rossi, Federalism 
and the Net Metering Alternative, ELECTRICITY J., Feb. 2016, at 13.  
27 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (upholding state antitrust regulation of 
natural gas sales).  
28 Id. at 1599 (courts must consider “the target at which the state law aims in determining whether 
[the] law is pre-empted.”).  
29 PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, Hughes v. 
Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 382, No. 14-614 (Oct. 19, 2015); CPV Maryland, LLC v. Talen 
Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 356, No. 14-623 (Oct. 19, 2015).  
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opportunity for states (who may choose to eliminate customer bidding into 
wholesale demand response markets) “removes any conceivable doubt” as to its 
compliance with the allocation of federal-state authority under the FPA.30 
However, the majority’s analysis falls short of reasoning that the FPA requires 
FERC to allow a state to opt out any time it regulates activities that impact 
retail sales. Much like New York v. FERC31 recognized FERC’s authority to 
regulate bundled retail transmission, even though the agency had not exercised 
this authority in its open access regulations,32 ESPA envisions how the agency’s 
market policies can evolve and reach into some areas states previously may have 
regulated on their own. FERC’s opt-out policy certainly bolstered the rationali-
ty of the agency’s demand response regulations, in the view of the EPSA 
majority. But the Court did not conclude that state veto option is required by 
the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation of state barriers to 
demand response as a practice affecting wholesale markets. As long as FERC 
exercises its authority over a practice that directly affects wholesale markets, 
nothing in the FPA requires the agency to always give the states a way of 
opting out of wholesale market policies.  
For example, Order 745 allows states to prohibit any retail customer de-
mand response participation in wholesale markets. In recognition of a diversity 
of state approaches, nothing in Order 745 also appears to require a state to 
endorse any specific retail demand response program, let alone eliminate state 
prohibitions on retail customer participation in wholesale markets. If, however, 
FERC were to make a finding that a state’s prohibition on retail customer 
bidding demand response resources into wholesale markets serves no purpose 
but to protect incumbents while significantly harming competition in interstate 
energy markets, agency elimination of this barrier could be warranted. Under 
current FERC policies, some states similarly limit retail customers from 
providing excess energy from rooftop solar or energy storage to the grid, and 
some of these state barriers could similarly go too far. 
EPSA’s recognition of flexibility for state retail demand response policies 
as long as these complementary federal energy market objectives can help us to 
understand how best to approach state policy experimentation with other 
customer energy resources. For example, states cannot prohibit utilities from 
offering net metering to retail customers. Under a statute Congress adopted in 
2005, utilities are required to offer net metering “upon request,” and states are 
																																																								
30 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
31 New York v. FERC, 533 U.S. 1 (2002). 
32 Id. at 28 (noting that FERC’s choice not to assert jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission in 
its open access order “represents a statutorily permissible policy choice”).  
2016] Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy Resources  31
required to consider net metering programs; to the extent a state regulatory 
authority declines to implement a net metering program, it is required to state 
the reasons for this in writing.33 Even beyond this federal statutory standard, if 
FERC were to find that a state’s regulatory prohibition on new entrants serves 
no purpose but benefitting incumbents while threatening competitive wholesale 
markets (as some state limits on third-party solar providers may), the agency 
could potentially address these barriers. For similar reasons, FERC appears to 
possess the authority to eliminate significant state barriers to retail customer 
energy storage resource participation in wholesale markets.  
Order 745 was the culmination of an evolving major federal policy initia-
tive to encourage wholesale demand response participation, while FERC’s 
policies regarding many other customer energy resources, such as retail net 
metering and energy storage, remain inchoate. As with demand response, the 
agency may find it expedient to encourage states to pursue a broad range of 
policy options with net metering and customer storage, including allowing 
states to opt out by prohibiting customers from participating. It seems particu-
larly important for FERC to consider using a cooperative federalism approach 
to encourage adjacent complementary state policy initiatives where new tech-




EPSA is far more than a victory for demand response participation in 
wholesale markets. It also invites policy experimentation, without fixing a 
sphere of authority for state regulators that lays beyond the FPA’s reach. As 
with FERC’s approach to demand response, the agency’s regulatory initiatives 
for other customer energy resources should continue to consider cooperative 
federalism programs that provide flexibility, including the possibility of a state 
opt out. Just as important, a state veto is not required by the FPA and should 
not be understood as an invitation for parochialism or for protecting incum-
bents at the expense of competitive, efficient, and reliable interstate power 
markets. EPSA leaves states considerable leeway in adopting policy initiatives 
for customer energy resources, but FERC cannot shy away from exercising its 
statutory responsibility to set basic ground rules for interstate energy markets—
including the elimination of significant state barriers, where warranted.  
																																																								
33 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1251, 119 Stat. 966 (2005) (amending 
section 111(d) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978).  
